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Twenty-First-Century 
Problems—Twentieth-Century 
International Law 
Harold Hongju Koh* 
It is great to be back here with so many friends. I have former 
students, colleagues from the State Department, and members of the 
two law schools.  
As Dean Scharf said, in my last four decades, I have spent more 
than thirty years as an international law professor, five years as a 
dean, twenty years as a human rights lawyer, and ten years in the 
U.S. government. 
Just to give you some pictures, the upper left-hand corner is me 
appearing before the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva; the 
upper right is at the Kremlin for the Nuclear Security Summit; the 
bottom left, Afghanistan; and the bottom right, Guantanamo. I first 
went to Guantanamo in 1992, and I have been there now, I think, 
nineteen times. 
On the left, Iraq; in the middle, Greece, for the financial crisis; on 
the far right was with Secretary Albright at the funeral of Kim Dae-
jung, former President of Korea and Nobel Prize winner. And, I 
appeared in many courts: the International Court of Justice on the 
left, in the Kosovo case; the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg; the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights; and as 
the head of our delegation to the International Criminal Court. 
 
* Harold Hongju Koh is Sterling Professor of International Law at Yale 
Law School. He returned to Yale Law School in January 2013 after 
serving for nearly four years as the 22nd Legal Adviser of the U.S. 
Department of State. He first began teaching at Yale Law School in 
1985 and served as its fifteenth Dean from 2004 until 2009. From 2009 
to 2013, he took leave as the Martin R. Flug ‘55 Professor of 
International Law to join the State Department as Legal Adviser, 
service for which he received the Secretary of State’s Distinguished 
Service Award. From 1993 to 2009, he was the Gerard C. & Bernice 
Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale Law School, and 
from 1998 to 2001, he served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. He holds a B.A. degree from 
Harvard College and B.A. and M.A. degrees from Oxford University, 
where he was a Marshall Scholar. He earned his J.D. from Harvard Law 
School, where he was Developments Editor of the Harvard Law Review. 
Before coming to Yale, he served as a law clerk for Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun of the United States Supreme Court and Judge Malcolm 
Richard Wilkey of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
worked as an attorney in private practice in Washington, and served as 
an Attorney-Adviser for the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
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I took many flights, and this is the most famous. This has become 
classic. We were flying into Tripoli after the Libya intervention on a 
transport plane from Malta, and because Secretary Clinton was there, 
we were put on these four nice seats. We got on, and they started 
taking pictures of us. So I texted to her “look over your shoulder,” 
and that’s what she is reading.  
I worked on issues, both natural and manmade: Wikileaks, the 
earthquake in Haiti, the Fukushima meltdown in Japan, the Arab 
awakening, human rights issues, international criminal law, 
cyberspace, economic and private international law issues, and public 
health. Here I am with Chen Guangcheng, the blind Chinese dissident 
with whom I spent a number of days in Beijing, and here he is in his 
apartment at NYU. 
The most challenging issues concern the fallout of September 
11th, which is now nearly thirteen years ago. So, in my capacity as 
Legal Adviser at the State Department, I played a number of roles. I 
mentioned in the introduction to Dean Scharf’s book that I was a 
managing partner of a law firm of about 200 lawyers, about 350 
people total. I was the general counsel to Secretary Clinton. It is like 
being the general counsel of any government agency—we buy 
buildings, but they are in Kabul. We get visas, but in Baghdad. 
I was the internal conflict manager. I was the internal conflict 
manager in the department for a far-flung department as Ambassador 
Hodges knows. A unique role of the Legal Adviser is to be the 
designated spokesperson or conscience of the U.S. government on 
international law. 
If the U.S. is doing something that speaks to the issue of 
international law, I think it is the duty of the Legal Adviser to 
explain why we think the position is legal, and then, finally, if we get 
sued in any forum, whether in an international court or in a domestic 
court, I am the designated defender, or I was the designated defender. 
I was Of Counsel on numerous Supreme Court briefs, and I also 
appeared and argued in several different international tribunals. So 
what are some things that I find, as I have now left, that people don’t 
fully grasp? 
By the way, here is a picture of my brother Howard, who is the 
Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services. He is the highest-
ranking public health official in America. My mother loves the picture 
because it looks like President Obama works for us. 
The inference is you are not the only lawyer. As I said, in the 
State Department, there are over 200 lawyers. At the Defense 
Department, how many lawyers do you think there are? Can anyone 
guess? How about 17,000; the Justice Department, probably about 
10,000 to 15,000 lawyers; Treasury, National Security Council, CIA, 
Director of National Intelligence, Homeland Security. 
So a U.S. government condition has to be brokered between all of 
these agencies, not to mention the White House Counsel’s office and 
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the National Security Council’s lawyer’s office. One issue, as 
academics often say, is that the legal opinion of the government 
stopped where it got interested, and the short answer is, that’s where 
they stopped agreeing. 
What they didn’t say is because they couldn’t get an agreement 
on the position. So they just stated what they agreed upon and kept 
moving forward. 
Secondly, and this may be obvious, you are not your own client. 
When you are a professor, you can just say whatever you think is 
right, but if Hillary Clinton is your client, she is pretty smart, and if 
she works for Barack Obama, he is pretty smart, and they are both 
lawyers themselves. 
So the question is not what you think is the right thing to do 
lawfully; the question is whether what your client wants to do is 
legally available to them or not. So you can say that that is legally 
available; you can say that it is legally unavailable. For example, I 
think torture is legally unavailable as an option or, what is sometimes 
the case, in cases you say it is lawful, but it is lawful as a matter of 
policy. 
And here is an incredible thing. I wrote a lot of books and 
articles. The precedent that you follow is not what you said in your 
private capacity. They don’t care what Harold Koh wrote in a 
footnote when he was coming up for tenure at age twenty-nine. What 
they care about is the opinions of the Office of the Legal Adviser, 
which have gone back since 1848. 
And when the people in my office looked at the precedents of the 
office, they looked to the precedents of the Office of the Legal 
Adviser, which is as it should be, because after all, where has more 
thought gone in: an opinion that has been brokered with thousands of 
other lawyers in the government on matters of life and death after a 
career in international law, or something you threw into an article in 
a footnote to complete a tenured piece? 
Now, you have many roles as I have said. And perhaps most 
important, you must play the hand you are dealt. You don’t get to 
choose. 
There is a favorite story about the two guys from Galway who are 
walking down the road. I say this because St. Patrick’s Day was 
yesterday, and my wife is Irish. And the one guy says to the other, 
“How do you get to Dublin?” 
And the first guy goes, “You know, I wouldn’t start from here.” 
So they said to me, “Would you like to be Legal Adviser in a time 
of peace and prosperity, or instead, would you rather be the Legal 
Adviser during three wars—Afghanistan, Iraq, and against Al-Qaeda, 
Taliban, and associated forces—in the worst economic crisis since the 
Depression?” And then, you move on to natural disasters in places 
like Haiti and Fukushima, and then throw into the mix the release of 
millions of documents in Wikileaks, et cetera. And then add to it the 
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most political environment in American history, which has created 
this set of deadlock, and you might say, “No, I wouldn’t start from 
here.” 
But you don’t get to choose. You play the hand you are dealt, 
and I analogize to people who do criminal law. You could, over the 
course of a long career, be an expert on criminal law. Sometimes you 
do criminal defense work; sometimes you do prosecutions; sometimes 
you are a judge; sometimes you are a professor. 
You are always doing the same body of law, but you are going to 
emphasize different things, depending on what role you are in. So you 
are not going to emphasize the same things if you are a white collar 
defense lawyer than if you are a prosecutor. That doesn’t mean you 
are inconsistent; it just means that you are playing a different role 
with the same body of law. 
So I found this to be an interesting challenge. I consider myself in 
my lifetime to have the exact same commitments with different roles. 
I am a man of peace, I think. I have spent my life teaching 
international law. I believe I am a defender of human rights, and I 
happened to be for four years a lawyer for a nation at war, and I tried 
to do that to the best of my ability. It was not easy. It was in some 
ways a relief to return to the academic world where I can say just 
what I want and nobody cares. 
But I think that’s because sometimes I am asked, as a human 
rights lawyer, how do I defend drones? And the answer is pretty easy. 
I think all torture is illegal no matter how it is used. I don’t think the 
President can be the torturer-in-chief. But it is the very nature of the 
laws of war, which is called international humanitarian law, that some 
killing is lawful if it is done in the context of the laws of war. 
You may not like it, but if you were the lawyer for the U.S. 
government, it is your inescapable duty to draw a difficult line 
between lawful and unlawful, killing those who do or do not save 
innocent lives. 
And you have to defend those lines. It is much better to have 
people that care about the rule of law and human rights than people 
who don’t care. 
There is a baseball manager, who once said when he was getting 
flack for a decision he made, “That’s okay over there. Their job is to 
say stuff over there. My job is to do stuff.” And I would encourage 
everybody here to take their time in the government because there is 
a long, long way from a good idea to actually getting it done. 
Now, obviously 9/11 changed our lives. It was itself a grotesque 
human rights violation: 3,000 innocent people getting killed for going 
to work. It signaled a new kind of war between a terrorist network 
that crosses borders and whose goal has been essentially to attack 
civilian targets and major western countries. 
It demanded a strong response, but one that was also respectful of 
human rights. It is combined in a blog that I now write in the idea of 
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“just security”—not just security but a just security in which law is 
an important piece. Not “lawfare” as it is sometimes dismissed by 
some, but in fact, a way of thinking about how to defend our human 
rights while not making the 9/11 era the new normal, and I think 
that has been one of the great challenges. 
Now, against this background, you face constant challenges, and I 
will give you this example. My very first day of work I came in, and 
somebody said to me “Harold”—this was 8:30 in the morning—”we 
just got a call from Customs at one of the major ports. The 
cryogenically frozen embryo of a panda bear is being held in a metal 
tank, and it is being attacked by private litigants.” And the question 
is: Is this embryo entitled to foreign sovereign immunity?”  
It occurred to me that I think the framers of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act may never have thought of this question. 
Or I will give you this one:  
We have a group of soldiers who are called Cyber Command. One 
of the great ironies is the various combatant commands have got 
these guys who are tremendously physically fit. The guys in Cyber 
Command look like Jack Black. 
Their fingers fly across the keyboard. If you have a guy sitting in 
Fort Meade, Maryland, who hits a key stroke, and it creates an effect 
in another country in the world and brings down a server, is that 
subject to the Geneva Conventions or not? And guess what—the 
Geneva Convention and the framers of the Geneva Convention did 
not think about that issue. 
More than that, the problem of having twenty-first-century 
problems and twentieth-century international law is that it cuts 
across the board. Why? Because the great spasm of international 
lawmaking came after World War II: the U.N. Charter, the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the ITL, which became the WTO. 
Most of the national security legislation we have was adopted in 
the wake of Vietnam and Watergate in the early 1980s and 1970s: the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act,1 the Arms Export 
Control Act,2 and the Intelligence Oversight Act.3 I have written 
about all of these. 
In recent years, we don’t have new laws. Congress, as you know, 
doesn’t approve treaties. Congress doesn’t pass many statutes. It is a 
branch of the government that even has great difficulty enacting a 
way to avoid our default on our debt or raising of the debt limit. 
 
1. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 
(2013). 
2. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 
22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2799aa-2 (2013) 
3. The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, S. 2284, 96th Cong. (as passed 
by Senate, June 3, 1980). 
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So the law will not change through normal amendment processes. 
So what is it, then, that allows us to adapt twentieth-century 
international law to twenty-first-century problems? Do we have a 
strategy—not just a way to solve a particular problem of the day, but 
do we have a strategy? And I want to argue that we do—it is called 
international law as smart power. 
I am going to make a strong claim for that. Not only is it a 
strategy—it doesn’t always work immediately—but the alternative, 
which is a hard power approach, tends not to work either. Worse than 
that, it tends to lead to structural failure. 
My colleague at Yale, Paul Kennedy, writes about the decline and 
fall of the great powers.4 He talks about how, century after century, 
the leading hegemon tried to use hard power, and then ended up in a 
situation that he calls imperial overstretch.5 They simply didn’t have 
enough soldiers, and then they collapsed, and then they were replaced 
by another world hegemon, which is briefly ascended and falls prey to 
the exact same phenomena.6 
A sustainable strategy cannot be one in which we use troops and 
hardware and the threat of force to achieve every outcome, and it is 
also not one that plays to the advantage of having a system that we 
call international law developed from the second century. 
Now, think this: There are two broad alternatives if you have 
twentieth-century law and twenty-first-century problems. One I will 
call the black hole approach, or you can think of it as the Tina 
Turner approach. What’s law got to do with it? What’s law but a 
sweet old-fashioned notion? 
I would argue that that was the fundamental approach taken by 
the last administration in response to 9/11. We have been hit. It is a 
new situation. There are no legal constraints. We are in a black hole. 
We should respond and do whatever is necessary, and forget about 
the framework of international law that has been established. 
Let’s disengage from the U.N. Let’s disengage from the 
International Criminal Court, and let’s disengage from the Human 
Rights Council, all of these things. This is the black hole approach. 
The Geneva Conventions under this scenario are “quaint,” said 
the general counsel of the White House, Alberto Gonzales.7 In other 
words, since they didn’t anticipate the situation, they are irrelevant.   
4. See, e.g., PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 
515 (1989). 
5. See id. 
6. See id. 
7. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, on 
Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War 
to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, to President  
George W. Bush 2 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf. 
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So what’s the other alternative to black hole? I call it translation, 
the spirit of the laws. 
In other words, the law that we have has some objective purpose. 
What is the response to a particular situation, which is most true to 
the spirit of the law that we have, even though it isn’t written to 
address the current situation? It is an interpretive challenge in which 
you try to construe existing law to meet an existing circumstance. 
So I want to argue—and if you remember nothing else, remember 
these three words—that the strategy of international law and smart 
power is engage, translate, and leverage. When in doubt, the United 
States should engage with other partners around our values, not 
disengage. 
Second, when in doubt, translate. Don’t argue that there are 
black holes. Rather, apply the spirit of the laws to meet the  
twenty-first-century challenges, and then, if you have a point of 
leverage, use law with other tools to produce policy. 
Military force is certainly part of this package, but you don’t try 
to do everything with hard power. You also use diplomacy, 
development, technology markets, international institutions, et cetera. 
Engage, translate and leverage. 
And I would contrast this to an opposite view. Unilateralism, not 
engagement; black hole, not translation; going it alone, not leveraging 
your resources. Now, where did this come from? You could call this 
an Obama-Clinton doctrine. President Obama in his inaugural 
address said, “A new era of engagement has begun . . . where living 
our values doesn’t make us weaker, it makes us safer and it makes us 
stronger.”8 In other words, engage around our values. 
Then, Hillary Clinton argued that we should use a smart power 
approach, the full range of tools at our disposal, including respect for 
law, human rights, private partnerships, et cetera. People thought it 
was just a slogan, but my job was to give content to this. 
Now, if you Google “Hillary Clinton” and “smart power,” you will 
see dozens of speeches that she gave over four years sketching out this 
strategy,9 which I think can be remembered as an Obama-Clinton 
doctrine. 
 
8. President Barack Obama, Address to Joint Session of Congress  
(Feb. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-
Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress/. 
9. See Clinton’s Confirmation Opening Statement, CBS NEWS (Jan. 13, 
2009, 11:18 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/clintons-confirmation-
opening-statement/; Sec’y Hillary Clinton, Remarks on the Smart Power 
Approach to Counterterrorism at John Jay School of Criminal  
Justice (Sept. 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/clintons-speech-smart-power-
approach-counterterrorism-september-2011/p25854; Lucy Madison, In 
Farewell Speech, Clinton Calls for “Smart Power” on Global Stage, CBS 
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Now, how do you apply this strategy to four kinds of  
twenty-first-century challenges: human rights, international single 
justice, assisted reproductive technologies, and twenty-first-century 
war? I could give dozens of examples, but let me start. Take Burma: 
Aung San Suu Kyi was under house arrest. 
She was a duly elected leader. With regard to Burma, we had 
imposed stiff sanctions, increasingly stiff sanctions,10 and then the 
question: Do we engage with her? Do we engage with the Burmese 
regime? We did both. 
Then, we translate a strategy for imposing sanctions, a ratchet up 
strategy with a ratchet down strategy, action for action, and then try 
to leverage that into rule of law and human rights. 
Now, Aung San Suu Kyi is the chair of the parliamentary 
committee on rule of law and human rights in the Burmese 
legislature.11  
Or how about this one: 
LGBT issues. Now, the last administration did little on this issue. 
In fact, they disengaged from the Human Rights Council. Hillary 
Clinton was going to the Human Rights Council because we 
reengaged and got elected twice, and the question: What speech does 
she give on Human Rights Day? 
So, she went and gave a speech in which she said quite simply 
that LGBT rights are human rights, and human rights are LGBT 
rights.12 This is a pure translation exercise. Do you see, she said 
whatever you thought human rights were, they include the rights of 
LGBTs. 
So all the apparatus and protection that we have developed over 
the years to protect human rights now protects these individuals. And 
she had said this before at the Beijing women’s conference where she 
went as First Lady and said “women’s rights are human rights.”13 
 
NEWS (Feb. 1, 2013, 8:29 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/in-
farewell-speech-clinton-calls-for-smart-power-on-global-stage/. 
10. See MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41336, U.S. 
SANCTIONS ON BURMA 3–5 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ R41336.pdf.  
11. AP, Myanmar’s Suu Kyi to Chair Parliamentary Committee, THE ASAHI 
SHIMBUN (Aug. 7, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/ 
around_asia/AJ201208070100. 
12. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks in Recognition of International 
Human Rights Day, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Dec. 6, 2011), 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/12/178368.ht
m. 
13. First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks for the United Nations 
Fourth World Conference on Women  
(Sept. 5, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-
data/conf/fwcw/conf/gov/950905175653.txt. 
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In other words, we are not going to treat human rights as rights 
that attach to a very limited group of individuals. Then, leverage this 
foreign policy initiative with a set of domestic initiatives: an 
elimination of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in the military; provision of 
same-sex benefits in both government and private jobs; challenging 
the Defense of Marriage Act; supporting litigation on same-sex 
marriage at the U.S. Supreme Court in the Windsor14 and Perry15 
cases. 
So, you have seen in six years a change in the treatment of LGBT 
issues in the United States of America and worldwide, and now it is 
Uganda that is on the defensive for having antigay legislation.16  
Or how about Chen Guangcheng? He was a dissident.17 
He was under house arrest in Shandong Province. He escaped. He 
broke his foot. He contacted the U.S. Embassy and asked whether he 
could come in. We could have said, no, we are not going to jeopardize 
our relationship with China for one guy. Instead, we decided to 
engage, bring him in, and engage with the Chinese government about 
his future.18 
And one of the issues that was raised was, can he really be 
allowed to come into the embassy? I had to give a legal opinion on 
this while traveling in China, and people said, we can’t possibly have 
a legal opinion which allows every single person in China who fears 
persecution coming into our embassy. 
And I said, maybe not, but we could have a legal opinion, which 
says that the United States has a right to admit somebody for 
emergency medical care for a short period of time, and that’s a 
sufficient basis for him to come in. 
And then, working with a private institution and New York 
University, we leveraged this, first into his leaving the embassy, and 
then moving to the campus in New York, and he is now in the United 
States continuing his human rights work: engage, translate, and 
leverage. 
 
14. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act).   
15. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (denying petitioners’ 
standing to sue the State of California after it refused to defend 
Proposition 8, limiting legal marriage to heterosexual partners, before 
federal courts that ruled it unconstitutional). 
16. Alan Cowell, Uganda’s President Signs Antigay Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/world/africa/ugandan-
president-to-sign-antigay-law.html. 
17. See Akiko Fujita et al., Chen Guangcheng: Chinese Dissident Arrives in 
US, ABC NEWS (May 19, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/International/ 
chen-guangcheng-chinese-dissident-arrives-us/print?id=16384545. 
18. See id. 
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How about International Criminal Justice? In your CLE 
materials—and I am eager to see whether I can get some CLE credit 
for my own speech—I have an article that I would ask you to read at 
some point called International Criminal Justice 5.0. 
Obviously, the U.S. pioneered international criminal law at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo and then supported that with a series of ad 
hoc criminal tribunals: Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and 
Cambodia. But then, it put itself in the bizarre posture under the 
Bush Administration of attacking the standing of the International 
Criminal Court.19 
So we are supporting ad hoc tribunals, and we are opposed to the 
standing tribunal, even though the ad hoc tribunals are phasing into 
standing international criminal justice institutions? 
So the question is how to align those policies so they make sense, 
even though Congress has passed laws preventing us from financial 
support for the International Criminal Court.20 
Part of the strategy that we put forward was we don’t change any 
laws because we can’t. We are not allowed to vote. But, we will turn 
the policy around. I said to my son, “It is like the time when we 
turned around the car in our garage without opening the doors. It is 
going to take a long time, and we better hope nobody notices.” 
But as you notice, we engaged for the first time. We went to all 
the different conferences. We shifted our position to one that now 
says we do not oppose the object and purpose of the ICC statute. We 
support all pending prosecutions, including the Libya referral,21 and 
the policy has turned 180 degrees. 
Or how about this one? Shortly after I became Legal Adviser, 
somebody came to me and said there is a lesbian couple that is living 
in a foreign country—I won’t say which one—and they have had a 
fertilized embryo implanted into one of the members of the couple 
who is an American citizen. Neither the egg nor the sperm is from an 
American, but this woman will carry the baby to term over nine 
months in this foreign country and deliver that baby. What is the 
citizenship of the baby? 
 
19. See Elise Keppler, The United States and the International Criminal 
Court: The Bush Administration’s Approach and a Way Forward Under 
the Obama Administration, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 2, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/02/united-states-and-international-
criminal-court-bush-administration-s-approach-and-wa. 
20. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 
107-228, § 113(c), 116 Stat. 1350, 1359 (2002). 
21. See Edith M. Lederer, AP, US Supports War Crimes Tribunal for First 
Time, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2011, 12:40 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/02/ 
AR2011030200163.html. 
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Now, we look at the law, and it says that the law requires that 
the child have a natural relationship with a U.S. citizen parent. That 
had been construed to mean a genetic relationship. What’s the 
problem? Obviously, the woman is carrying to term a fertilized egg 
with which she has no genetic relationship. But the term is not 
“genetic;” it is “natural.” 
So we had a meeting, and my conclusion was “natural” means 
genetic or gestational. That’s translation. I didn’t find it anywhere, 
but it seemed reasonable within the spirit of the laws. The alternative 
is to leave the kid stateless. His mother is an American citizen. It 
struck me as consistent, and this is now the prevailing interpretation. 
I say this because the great challenge, and one of the things I am 
working on for the future, is the human rights of clones. Maybe one of 
you here is a clone. I am not going to ask, but as they say, we have 
the technology. But have we done the necessary thinking on this? 
Imagine this: Could every one of you come here with your cloned 
partner? Would you respect that person’s human rights, or would 
your cloned partner be your slave? 
Or how about this? If you suddenly had a heart problem, could 
you take the heart of your clone and have it implanted into you and 
use that person’s body for your spare parts? Do you treat them like 
illegitimates or people with a different sexual orientation as they used 
to be treated, as lesser beings? 
Now, they weren’t born human, in the sense of being born live, 
but they are the product of modern technology. Assistive reproductive 
technology is now a common way to make families, and we don’t have 
a human rights theory for clones, but we better get one. And that’s 
something I am going to be hoping to spend a fair amount of my time 
on in the years ahead. 
Or how about cyberspace? By its very nature, cyberspace is 
something that nobody drafting rules of international law in the 
twenty-first century thought of, or thinks about. There are actually 
four different dimensions. 
There is freedom on the Internet, which, of course, we would like 
to promote, but on the other hand, Internet freedom can also pay for 
terrorist financing or communications to allow people to attack 
civilian targets. Interestingly, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights Article 19 presciently thinks about the right to receive secrets 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless 
of frontiers.22 It is almost as though it was thinking about the Internet 
in 1948. 
But there are at least four other dimensions of the Internet: 
intellectual property, piracy e-commerce, cyber security, and cyber 
 
22. See, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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warfare. So the question is: Can we develop a regime that balances 
the competing concerns? 
Now, there are some countries, particularly China, that have 
offered a theory of black hole, which is there is no law. What has law 
got to do with it? 
I wrote an article in the Harvard International Law Journal, 
which argued it is a translation exercise.23 International law governs 
cyberspace. We engage through diplomatic law talk like the 
governmental experts, the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications. We make it clear that cyberspace is not a  
law-free zone, and we try to leverage it into various standard-setting 
exercises through projects like the Tallinn Manual,24 et cetera. 
Or take this: Most war these days is not conducted by soldiers; it 
is conducted by private security contractors. You know, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger. You see movies about this all the time: The 
Expendables, The Expendables II, The Expendables III. Do these guys 
have to follow the Geneva Conventions? They are not soldiers. 
What’s the solution? Engage. 
We developed a set of principles called the Montreux Document.25 
We translated it into an international code of conduct that now 
governs 500 companies. We leveraged it through contractors to 
internalize norms and to contract deliver. This is, of course, the 
subject of my academic writing, the norm internalization. 
And then what about the Arab awakening? This is one of these 
things that happened on our watch, and Secretary Clinton said 
something very profound to me very early on. She said, “This is 
crazy. But you know what? Most of these people don’t want to join 
Al-Qaeda.” 
We need a smart power strategy to address that. And what does 
that mean? It means that we try to win the hearts and minds of 
ordinary Muslims in their home countries, to try to get involved in 
economic and political development at home. But this will be a group 
of hard core Al-Qaeda who are not likely to become democrats. 
You know, I’m sorry. Osama bin Laden was not about to convert 
and become the head of an opposition party. So on September 11, 
2011, Secretary Clinton gave a speech called Smart Power Approach 
 
23. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, 54 
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1 (2012), http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Koh-Speech-to-Publish1.pdf. 
24. INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS AT THE INVITATION OF THE NATO COOP. CYBER 
DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013), 
available at https://ccdcoe.org/research.html. 
25. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE MONTREUX  
DOCUMENT (2009), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf. 
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to Counterterrorism, where she said to use force for limited purposes 
in a broader framework that deploys diplomacy, development, 
education, and people-to-people outreach; and challenge the ideology, 
the propaganda, and the appeal. But in the short-term, precise and 
persistent force remains a necessary part of the package.26 
Now, why do I say that? Because after I got into the State 
Department, and the use of drones began, a lot of people suddenly 
started saying this is just like the last administration. There is no 
difference. To which I say, imagine this thought experiment: Seven 
days after September 11th, Congress passes the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 
forces.27 
Suppose the winner of the popular vote is the President of the 
United States,28 and suppose he appears and says the following things:  
“I am speaking now to the whole world. We have just been 
attacked. Three thousand civilians have been killed of many different 
nationalities. That’s a grotesque human rights violation. I want to tell 
you what I am not going to do, and I am going to tell you what I am 
going to do. I am not going to invade Iraq. I am not going to torture 
anyone. I am not going to open Guantanamo. I am not going to set 
up military commissions. I am not going to kidnap people and put 
them in black sites. All of these things are illegal. They are wrong, 
and they destroy our legitimacy. 
But here is what I must do: I am going to apply a smart power 
approach to counter terrorism, in which our main goal is to speak to 
the people of modern Islam. With regard to those people who did 
September 11th, if they are in a cave in Tora Bora, I will use every 
technological means available to me as Commander-in-Chief, 
including drones, to suppress the threat. If I can arrest them, I will. 
But if I need to use weapons of war, I will use it consistently with the 
laws of war. I will be transparent. I will consult with our allies. I will 
consult with Congress, and God help us that this is over soon.” 
 
26. See Clinton, supra note 9 (addressing the shift in American policy on 
terrorism toward a broad-based effort of diplomacy and aid). 
27. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 
115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the President of the United States to 
“use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001”). 
28. In the 2000 U.S. presidential election, Vice President Al Gore received 
approximately 500,000 more popular votes than did Governor George 
W. Bush, but Governor Bush won five more electoral votes than did 
Vice President Gore, resulting in Bush’s election as President. See 2000 
Presidential Electoral and Popular Vote, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/elecpop.htm (last updated Dec. 
2001).  
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Do you see the point? It is not about drones. If he had said that, 
we would say, that’s an essential piece of the picture. The fact of the 
matter is that drones are not a strategy; they are just a tool of war. 
They are not inherently legal or illegal. There are some tools of war 
that are inherently illegal like chemical weapons and land mines. 
Drones are not one of them.  
Whether they are legal or not depends on whether they are used 
consistently with the laws of war. So the strategy is engage, translate, 
and leverage. Engage our allies. Translate legal rules into lawful 
strategies of targeting detention, and leverage this with a broader 
approach to counter terrorism. 
Now, it took awhile. but finally, President Obama brought this 
policy explicitly there last May at the National Defense University. 
He said we have to define the struggle. There is no global perpetual 
War on Terror. We need to end a forever war. We should repeal, 
replace, and not expand the authorization for use of military force.29  
Drones can be part of a smart power approach if properly used 
along with other tools that can be an effective and a discriminate tool 
to help dismantle specific terrorist networks that engage with the 
United States.  
What he didn’t say is this: It is one thing to say we are leaving 
Iraq if it is still violent there. It is another thing to say we are leaving 
Afghanistan if it is still violent there. But if we have not actually 
defeated Al-Qaeda, they could attack us again on our own soil, and 
then people will say, “What were we doing for 13 years?” 
Now, it has been a long struggle, but it seems that the three 
aspects of this—and I have written a speech on this called How to 
End the Forever War—is, number one, disciplining drones. We need 
more transparency. We need more consultation, and we need more 
standard-setting.  
Secondly, defining the enemy to end the war. We are not at war 
with everybody who doesn’t like us. That’s a lot of people in the 
world. We are at war with those people who would attack us on 
civilian soil and have proven capacity to do that, and that’s 
essentially the Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.  
As we disengage from Afghanistan, the issue of the Taliban will 
be a separate issue. But self-radicalizers, like the guys at the Boston 
Marathon, are not part of Al-Qaeda. We didn’t declare war on them.  
And third, using a comprehensive approach to ending all three 
wars: decline military engagement, continue civilian engagement, 
develop civil society, and enhance diplomacy to bring about 
diplomatic solutions in these conflicts. 
 
29. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Defense 
University (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university. 
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And on Guantanamo, which has been a source of continuing 
disappointment, the President remains and says, again, he is 
determined to close it by the end of his presidency. And interestingly, 
if he does, and the war is declared over, he will lose his legal authority 
to detain.  
And so in the last six months, more movement has happened 
there than has happened in the previous four or five years with a 
whole set of policy processes, and I am not going to answer in the 
Q&A exactly how this can be done, but it includes blocking transfers 
to Yemen; getting a new envoy to do an outstanding job; moving to 
trials preferably in civilian courts; releasing the releasable; and 
establishing periodic review boards. 
Now, what about two other cases, humanitarian intervention? 
Case number one was Libya. Again, people think of “military” as a 
military operation. It was a smart power operation. Engage, translate 
and leverage. Join with many allies.  
Translate: that Gaddafi has forfeited his responsibility to protect, 
which creates a gap that must be filled by outsiders. The United 
States helps to establish a no-fly zone and then maintain it with an 
arms embargo, along with an assets freeze, diplomacy, travel ban, and 
accountability before the ICC to protect civilians and rebuild the 
country.  
Now, Libya is not a perfect environment by any stretch of the 
imagination, but the fact of the matter is that this worked. I am often 
criticized by my colleagues at Yale, and I say 10,000 to 15,000 people 
are alive today because of this approach. So I am not apologizing. 
What about Syria? The problem here was they started again with 
a smart power approach: how to combine diplomatic strategy and 
engagement with smart power to achieve a number of objectives, 
secure chemical weapons, get a ceasefire, oust al-Assad, secure 
humanitarian aid, and secure accountability.   
But the problems, of course, were persistent Russian vetoes.30 No 
Security Council resolution was, therefore, possible. There was a 
limited threat of a capacity to threaten force if you think that the 
Security Council has a monopoly on these situations. So that created 
a mismatch between the soft power tools that were available and the 
broader objectives. 
President Obama, unfortunately, has been better on politics, on 
principles than on the politics to achieve them. Suddenly after the 
acknowledged use of chemical weapons last August, the President 
 
30. See, e.g., Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N as Russia and China Veto 
Another Resolution on Syria Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/middleeast/russia-and-
china-veto-un-sanctions-against-syria.html. 
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threatened hard power and in such a surprising way that there was 
universal opposition.31  
That changed the issue into our conduct and called into question 
his commitment to engage in soft power at ending the war. Suddenly, 
it looked like he was going back to the old way. 
So what happened? Putin, Mr. Democracy, Mr. Human Rights, 
Mr. International Law Rights—and as written in the New York 
Times—where he says, “We must stop using the language of force and 
return to the path of civilized diplomatic and political settlement.”32 
That’s pretty hilarious. In other words, he plays the soft power card.  
So what happened? The fact of the matter was the threat of force 
jump-started diplomacy. The Administration’s position led by 
Secretary Kerry mutated back to engage, translate, and leverage, and 
they shifted finally to where they should have been: a smart power 
approach. And although it is happening slowly, the organization 
against the proliferation of chemical weapons is moving weapons out. 
It won the Nobel Peace Prize. 
What about the Ukraine? And here is where I will end. We have 
this situation, obviously Crimea; the Russians are trying to annex it. 
This by the way should call into doubt in all of your minds whether 
Vladimir Putin cares the least bit about sovereignty in Syria. He 
clearly cares not at all about sovereignty.  
And he is using a transparent dodge to annex Crimea, and the 
U.S. has asserted that the people of the Ukraine must determine their 
own future in direct dialogue. 
The referendum that just occurred—we have correctly called it 
under both domestic and international law illegitimate, contrary to 
the Ukrainian constitution, and illegal under international law.33 The 
key weapon is targeted smart sanctions on the plutocrats who could 
influence Putin to change the outcome and attempt to insert U.N. 
monitors into Crimea and various techniques of multilateral 
outcasting.   
Now, I was the person who argued for the independence of 
Kosovo at the International Court of Justice. This is a dramatically 
different situation. You should be very skeptical about referendums 
that occur under the barrel of a gun, and you should be very skeptical 
 
31. See Mark Landler & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Delays Syria Strike to 
Focus on a Russian Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/syrian-
chemical-arsenal.html. 
32. Vladimir V. Putin, Op-Ed., A Plea for Caution from Russia, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/ 
putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html. 
33. See Somini Sengupta, Vote by U.N. General Assembly Isolates Russia, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/ 
world/europe/General-Assembly-Vote-on-Crimea.html.  
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about the claim that Crimea can declare its own independence when 
actually the people of Ukraine have to declare the independence for 
Crimea. 
So this will be a battle ground in the months ahead. We will 
watch it play out. It will be a battle between the hard power 
approach of Putin, who is now moving more troops in, and the smart 
power approach on the other side who will prevail. Here is a situation 
where hard power is not a live option.  
So the question is: Do we have the courage of our convictions? 
How consistently and multilaterally can we apply this approach to 
bring the issue to ultimate the resolution?  
Yesterday, yet again in The New York Times front page, there 
was another story about Obama’s policies of retrenchment, what is 
viewed as weakness.34 I’m sorry. We don’t have a better alternative 
than the one he has put into play. Some people like surgery, and 
other people use chemotherapy. And guess what? Sometimes 
chemotherapy works, but you have got to go with it.   
But I hope I have persuaded you that not every episode may be a 
success, but there is a strategy here, and this is not Hugo Grotius’ 
international law; this is twenty-first-century international lawyering. 
Treating international law as a critical element of smart power is a 
better way to do it and to address twenty-first-century problems: 
engaging, translating, and leveraging laws as a tool of smart power. 
It is an extraordinarily interesting time to be an international 
lawyer. I am excited for you students who are getting into this field 
for the first time and watching all these things play out. I encourage 
you to think about this in broad strategic terms and not just what 
gets us through the next week. 
So I am delighted. Thank you very much for this great honor. I 
am delighted to receive it and happy to answer any questions you 
might have. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Koh, I will start with the Henry 
King question. Just because we are on the subject of the Ukraine 
right now, isn’t this a bit of a flip for you on the theme? Isn’t this a 
classic twentieth-century problem that you have to start with, and try 
to solve with twenty-first-century methods or approach? 
PROFESSOR KOH: Well, no, because I think that all of the 
different apparatuses of this are—so for example, under Ukrainian 
law, the Ukraine must vote. One question is the role of the diaspora 
in this.  
Second question is: What does it mean for Putin to say for the 
people that they protecting Russians. Again, I didn’t notice that they 
 
34. See David E. Sanger, Obama Policy Is Put to Test, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
17, 2014, at A1. 
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were under threat, but I think that the most elaborate response is the 
smart sanctions approach. 
During the Cold War, Russia was isolated. The Soviet Union was 
isolated. That made fewer levers to put pressure on. Now, there are 
deep interconnections. As we all know, the breakup of the Soviet 
Union led to the grotesque enrichment of very small numbers of 
people. Those people do things like buy basketball teams and spend 
huge amounts of money. Guess what? They like to travel. They like 
to put their money abroad. Those people have more influence over 
Putin than people realize. 
Just remember all the people who said that the only way to 
respond in Iran was to nuke their centrifuges. And guess what? We 
are working our way now to a multilateral deal because the sanctions 
actually worked. Just think of all the people who said that we would 
never get anywhere with Burma, with these sanctions and the 
enormous changes that came about there.  
So I think this is the difference between chemotherapy and 
surgery. But we are very sophisticated now in how these things are 
used. The whole U.S. government is involved and treasury sanctions 
are now involved—incredibly elaborate processes. And the most 
important thing is isolating and outcasting and tightening all of the 
screws.  
Nobody thought that the Russians would give way for a Syria 
chemical weapons deal. By the way, one of the reasons I object to 
those who believe that the U.N. Security Council has a monopoly on 
the use of force in these situations is that the U.N. Charter’s purposes 
are much broader than protecting territorial sovereignty.  
What does it mean to protect territorial sovereignty in the age of 
the Internet? The purpose of the U.N. is to protect human rights and 
many other things.  
And guess what? In the Cuban Missile Crisis, we did not say that 
the fact that the Russians were going to veto a resolution meant that 
we couldn’t do anything. We figured out legal responses involving a 
quarantine that allowed a mechanism to operate outside the U.N. that 
didn’t give it a stranglehold of the Russians. 
I am surprised now because international lawyers claim if the 
Russians are going to veto, we have absolutely no choice. Let the 
slaughter continue. If that’s really so, then any P-5 member, 
Permanent Five member, can commit genocide in its own territory, 
and nobody can do anything about it. That cannot be consistent with 
the object and purpose of the U.N. Charter. The human rights 
revolution extends to this. 
Now, I want to make a tough point here: There are some people 
who are pacifists. Many of them came out of the Vietnam War. 
That’s when I grew up. They do not believe that the use of force is 
ever appropriate. I respect that. I just don’t think that that’s how—I 
grew up in a different era.  
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I saw diplomacy backed by force create a situation in Dayton that 
led to a resolution of the Balkan crisis. He saw the lack of use of force 
in Rwanda lead to the slaughter of thousands. I really don’t think 
that the goal of the law was to permit one nation to block action and 
let thousands of innocent civilians get slaughtered. If that’s what the 
law condones, then we don’t have a very good interpretation of the 
law. 
And those people who say doing something would be legitimate 
but illegal, that to me is ridiculous. Did we say same-sex marriage is 
legitimate but illegal, or did we try to figure out a way in which you 
understand and reconcile your understanding of the law with what 
you think are the basic dimensions of justice in that circumstance?  
You know, Kosovo was in 1999. This is 2014. The law has not 
evolved since then? International lawyers’ thinking hasn’t been able 
to figure out a way in which you could both preserve the integrity of 
the U.N. system and prevent innocent lives from being taken?  
I said to Michael Scharf before, there is a great irony. You know, 
if you read Barack Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize lecture, he said go 
with something quite similar to what I said. He said something like, “I 
have just been elected president. I am getting a Peace Prize at the 
same time as I am Commander-in-Chief of the strongest military force 
ever assembled, and my job is to extricate ourselves from three wars, 
and I am going to have to use force to do it.”35  
And he goes on, I believe, in humanitarian intervention. To 
paraphrase, he said, “I believe that force can be used consistently 
with rules, and it is my deepest dilemma as to how to resolve my 
basic commitments to peace, justice, and human rights with the 
duties I have to my citizens of my country.”36  
So it is not an easy time, and if you believe that force is part of 
the package, the question is: How do you use force effectively, not 
irresponsibly? You know, blood, force, trauma-like invasions of Iraq 
turn out not to be very helpful, and they completely tap us out. 
So we have much more limited and targeted use of force. One of 
them happens to be drones, but let’s face it, those people that are 
worked up about drones, ten years from now, if someone fires a drone, 
it is not going to be taken out with a drone. It is going to be taken 
out with a cyber command.  
So let’s not fixate on the technology. Let’s fixate on the 
application of the law to the technology. The history of law of warfare 
is increasingly precise use of targeted weapons, starting with bows and 
 
35. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Acceptance of the Nobel 
Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
acceptance-nobel-peace-prize. 
36. See id. 
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arrows to catapults, to bombs, to guided missiles and now to even 
more automated devices.  
And then it will soon be cyber commands. And the question is 
how to bring those technological developments under a framework of 
law, and not under a framework of black hole. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very much for speaking. This 
question goes to both the idea of adaptation but also to the new 
technology. I definitely get a sense throughout—and you mentioned it 
explicitly—that much of the lawmaking apparatus at the federal level 
is stuck. But, I see going forward a problem not unlike what we had 
in World War I, where the laws of war were set in a Napoleonic era, 
and then we had a period of trenches, of airplanes, of chemical 
attacks, and the harms committed to troops and civilians were so 
egregious. They went so far beyond any realm of adaptation that you 
literally had to rewrite the rules. 
But, under the current paradigm, at least in the U.S., trying to 
get some sort of comprehensive future arrangement is next to 
impossible. 
Is there a point when you see where the abilities of legal 
translation will fail, and if so, and if the paradigm doesn’t change, 
what is a possible way out? There is only so far it can go, even under 
a very expansive State Department or administrative law regime, 
without some sort of lawmaking, some sort of legislative lawmaking 
power to change the system. 
So is there a point where it has to change, and if so, what is that 
change? 
PROFESSOR KOH: It is an excellent question. The materials that 
you have, the CLE materials include an article I published in the 
Georgetown Law Journal called Twenty-First-Century International 
Lawmaking. It describes the myriad of ways in which we now develop 
law, not just through formal treaty processes or statutory processes.37 
My view is actually translation goes pretty far. I found very few 
examples where it really did fail. I mean, drawing distinctions 
between civilians and combatants, defining the scope of an armed 
conflict, defining the difference between illegal and legal is jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. These are all still possible under translation. 
It just requires us to be more creative international lawyers, and you 
can create new forums that develop these rules. So the group of 
governmental experts is an ad hoc U.N. forum that is now addressing 
issues of cyber war. So a lot of this is engaging new lawmaking 
forums.  
 
37. Harold Hongju Koh, Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 
101 GEO. L.J. 725 (2013). 
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Now, your Dean Michael Scharf has written about the Grotian 
Moment. He argued, for example, that when we had ad hoc tribunals, 
and they were articulating the concept of drawing criminal enterprise, 
that became customary law, even without decades of state practice.38  
So we now have many, many more occasions where a consensus 
that a certain set of rules ought to govern a new situation can be 
treated as guide and practice going forward. And guess what? In this 
process, lawyers are the imaginative ones. This is the message I want 
to give to the students. Lawyers are creators. 
How many of you studied the Cuban Missile Crisis when you were 
an undergrad? When they started that process, they found missiles in 
Cuba. What were the three options that were presented? Number one, 
do nothing. That’s not good. Then you have missiles in Cuba pointing 
at Washington. Number two, ground invasion months after the Bay 
of Pigs. That’s not going to be so great. Number three, unilateral 
nuclear strike. Those three options are not great. What did they come 
up with instead? Quarantine. It looks like a blockade, but they called 
it something different, approved by a regional group, the organization 
of American states combined with track two diplomacy to get the 
missiles, the Jupiter missiles, out of Cuba. 
And guess what? That solved the crisis. And you know what? 
Every single international law scholar who wrote about it the next 
year called it illegal, and now it looks like lawyers creating a fourth 
option that created a better result. In that process, it is the lawyer 
who says don’t give me these three options and claim that they are 
the only ones when they are all bad. There is a fourth way to go.  
And if you look for that fourth way, that is consistent with the 
spirit of the laws. When we were working on drones, there were some 
people who said we think what we are doing is right. We just don’t 
want to defend it. And then other people say we can’t talk about this, 
or we are going to have to release all the information, to which my 
view was, do you think what we are doing is legal? If so, we have a 
duty as the United States of America to defend what is the line 
between lawful and unlawful targeting, and what’s the line between 
lawful and unlawful detention. 
And people can disagree with us, but if they agree, we can 
eventually write it into treaties and statutes and other kinds of 
documents. So this is the challenge ahead, and lawyers are the critical 
part of this process. You are not just potted plants; you are not just 
scriveners; you are creative participants in a policy process in which 
the law doesn’t answer all the questions on its face. You have to help 
interpret the law in light of modern understandings.  
 
38. See Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated 
Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental 
Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439 (2010).   
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And guess what? Originalism didn’t work so great. Doesn’t work 
so great for our constitutional law, and originalism doesn’t work that 
great in this setting either. But following the spirit of the laws, the 
object and purpose of the law, is what international lawyers are 
trained to do.  
 
